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1. Introduction  
 A research joint venture (RJV) is an agreement whereby its members coordinate research 
activities and share any subsequent innovations. The literature has examined several incentives 
to form a RJV; e.g., avoidance of costly duplications of efforts (Katz 1986), internalization of 
technical spillovers (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988, Kamien, Muller and Zang 1992), and 
synergy creation (Pastor and Sandonis 2002). Additionally, a RJV can also solve a certain 
appropriability problem. Since innovation eventually becomes common knowledge and can be 
adopted by rivals, an innovator fails to appropriate the full value of an innovation. This means 
that in cases privately funded R&D projects are unprofitable and therefore not undertaken. A 
RJV solves this problem by having the R&D costs shared upfront by the eventual beneficiaries 
of the innovation (Miyagiwa and Ohno 2002; Erkal and Piccinin 2010). 
 However, formation of a RJV comes with its own difficulty – an incentive or free-rider 
problem. While it appears within any cooperative arrangement, in the case of a RJV the incentive 
problem becomes particularly acute for two reasons. First, the members’ contributions to the 
venture are mostly in the form of human resources and proprietary technical know-how, the 
qualities of which cannot easily be assessed by other participants. Second, R&D outcomes are 
inherently stochastic, thereby making it well-nigh impossible to disentangle lack of success due 
to shirking from lack of success due to randomness. These two features of a RJV can give rise to 
opportunism, as participants are tempted, by the lack of detection, to contribute less than the 
level of R&D inputs stipulated in the agreement (Shapiro and Willig 1990).   
 In this paper we show that a RJV can overcome the free-rider problem by pre-committing 
to its termination date. To understand this result intuitively, consider the standard repeated-game 
setting. If R&D actions are unobservable and shirking goes undetected, a RJV member faces the 
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same (stationary) continuation payoff, whether it shirks or makes R&D efforts. In contrast, if a 
RJV has the termination date, the continuation payoffs are no longer stationary. In particular, the 
continuation payoff falls precipitously when the venture is dissolved and cooperation ends. 
Therefore, as the termination date approaches, each member feels an increasingly stronger 
incentive to succeed in order to avert the sharp drop in continuation payoff. We show that in fact 
there is a unique optimal termination date, i.e., an (ex ante) optimal duration, for a RJV. 
Furthermore, our model yields two empirically testable results. First, the optimal duration is 
positively related to the value of innovation per member. Second, the optimal duration is 
negatively related to the per-member flow cost of R&D. 
 The model also indicates that the membership size of a RJV affects its optimal duration. 
However, there are two conflicting effects. On the one hand, an increase in membership size 
reduces each member’s share of the total profit, reducing duration by the first result above. On 
the other, the presence of strong synergies and spillovers within a RJV can reduce the effective 
R&D cost per member, increasing duration by the second result above.  
 In the second part of the paper, using data from the European Eureka program, we 
examine whether our theoretical model is consistent with the empirical data. Launched in 1985 
to promote joint research projects as part of the EU’s innovation policy, the Eureka program 
provides our study with an ideal source of data for three reasons. First, each Eureka RJV is 
required to include partners from at least two different EU member countries. Since members 
often conduct research in separate countries, Eureka’s RJVs face difficulties in monitoring the 
quantity and quality of member contributions. Second, each Eureka project applicant is required 
to provide detailed information about the prospective RJV, including its termination date. This 
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means that Eureka RJVs pre-commit to their durations. Thus, Eureka RJVs satisfy two most 
important features of our theoretical model. 
 The Eureka program has an additional advantage in that its data are publicly available on 
its website. We thus know that the average Eureka project has the (ex ante) duration of 41.5 
months. However, the data exhibit large variations in duration, ranging from six months to 166 
months. The central question of our empirical investigation is to explain such variations. 
 Our theory points to the value of innovation per member as a key determinant of 
duration. This relation, however, cannot be evaluated directly because the Eureka data set does 
not provide innovation values. Obvious proxies such as the values of patents issued to Eureka 
RJVs are also unavailable. Instead, for our primary proxy, we draw upon recent empirical 
literature in international trade examining heterogeneity among firms within given industries. We 
do so for two reasons. Firstly, this literature establishes that firms that export earn greater profits 
than firms that do not. Secondly, more recent research links firm heterogeneity to the types of 
R&D firms undertake. In particular, Van Beveren and Vandenbussche (2010) show that firms 
pursuing product-and-process innovations are more likely to export than ones aiming at either 
purely product or purely process innovations. These two findings suggest that RJVs aiming for 
product-and-process innovations have higher commercial values than ones targeting purely 
product or process innovations. If so, our theory implies that product-and-process innovation 
RJVs commit to longer durations than the other two types of RJVs. Fortunately, the Eureka data 
set does specify the types of R&D conducted in Eureka projects. Using the product-and-process 
innovation as a proxy variable for the value of innovation, we find that product-and-process 
innovation RJVs have longer durations than purely process-innovation or purely product-
innovation RJVs, which is consistent with our theory. 
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  Our theoretical model also predicts that a member’s (flow) R&D cost has a negative 
effect on the duration of a RJV. Intuitively, when R&D flow costs are unobservable, there is a 
greater incentive to shirk. This increase in opportunism can be countervailed by a shortening of 
duration. To examine this effect we construct a monthly per member R&D cost variable from the 
Eureka data, and find this variable negatively related to the durations of Eureka projects as 
expected from our theory.  
   As for the effect of membership size, our regression results show that membership has a 
positive effect on the durations of Eureka projects, which according to our theory implies the 
presence of strong synergies within Eureka RJVs. This finding is consistent with recent empirical 
work that has identified synergy and spillovers as the important rationales for forming RJVs 
(e.g., Cassiman and Veugelers 2002, Hernan, Marin and Siotis 2003). 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 – 4 present our theoretical 
model. Sections 2 and 3 discuss the stability of a RJV when R&D efforts are observable and 
when they are not, respectively. Section 4 shows how, when R&D efforts are unobservable, a 
RJV can overcome the free-rider problem by specifying its termination date. Section 4 also 
derives the main predictions of the model. The empirical analysis is contained in sections 5 – 8. 
Section 5 discusses the Eureka data. Section 6 explains our methodology. Section 7 presents the 
estimation results. Section 8 checks the robustness of our empirical findings. The final section 
states our conclusions and suggests extensions for future research. 
 
2. RJVs with observable R&D actions 
 Consider m (≥ 2) symmetric firms interacting over an infinite number of periods. All 
actions take place at dates t = 1, 2,…. Suppose that firms form a RJV at t = 1. At each t ≥ 1, each 
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firm unilaterally decides whether to invest the amount k or not. If z (≤ m) firms invest k at t, then 
at date t + 1 there is innovation with probability 1 – φ(z), where φ(z) measures the venture’s 
(conditional) probability of failure to discover innovation. The innovation yields the flow of 
profits, the sum of which is worth π to each member firm in t + 1’s value. We assume that a RJV 
has a better chance of success when more members make R&D efforts.  
 
Assumption 1: The RJV’s (conditional) probability φ(z) of failure to discover innovation is 
monotone decreasing.1  
 
 We assume that firms are incapable of innovation when acting alone.2 This may be the 
case if R&D costs are too high or innovation is too risky (i.e., probability of innovation is too 
low) for an individual firm. For the moment we disregard the effects of synergy and spillovers 
within a RJV. 
 In the remainder of this section, we consider the benchmark case, in which firms can 
observe one another’s R&D actions. Suppose that firms play the following grim trigger strategy; 
at t = 1 invest k in R&D, and at all t ≥ 2, conditionally on innovation not having been discovered, 
invest k as long as all firms have done so to date; otherwise break up the RJV. 
 Below we write φz for φ(z) to lighten notation. If all m firms adopt the above strategy, at 
each date t the RJV discovers innovation with the (conditional) probability 1 – φm. If there is no 
success at t, firms face exactly the same prospect at t + 1 due to the stationary environment. 
Thus, the expected equilibrium payoff V satisfies the recursive equation: 
                                                
1 The literature often assumes that φ(z) = qz, where q is each firm’s individual probability of failure. Since qz < q, 
firms can pool risks by forming a RJV. 
2 This assumption can be relaxed without affecting the main results of the analysis. 
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  V = – k + (1 – φm)δπ + φmδV, 
where δ ∈(0, 1) is the discount factor. Collecting terms yields 
(1)  V = (– k + (1 – φm)δπ)/(1- φm δ). 
We assume that V > 0, implying that it is worthwhile to form a RJV. 
 A (one-period) deviation from the above strategy allows a shirking firm to save the R&D 
cost k but also increases the venture’s probability of failure to φm-1 > φm. In addition, shirking 
triggers termination of a RJV, meaning that a shirking firm expects the payoff (1 – φm-1)δπ.
3 
There is no shirking if and only if V ≥ (1 – φm-1)δπ. 
 
3. RJVs with unobservable R&D actions 
 Now, assume that firms cannot observe one another’s R&D actions. If all firms invest in 
R&D, the expected payoff per firm is still V as defined in (1) above. However, shirking now 
becomes undetected and hence unpunished. Consequently, shirking only results in an increase in 
a RJV’s probability of failure without triggering its dissolution, thereby yielding the expected 
payoff 
(2)  Vd = (1 – φm-1)δπ + φm-1δV 
to a shirker. Therefore, there is no shirking if and only if  
(3)  V – Vd = – k + Δmδ(π – V), 
where 
  Δm ≡ φm-1 – φm > 0 
                                                
3 Assume, for simplicity, that other firms cannot exclude a shirker from access to innovation discovered at t. This 
assumption is inconsequential for the discussion to follow. 
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due to monotonicity of φm. While π > V, the right-hand side of (3) can be negative, if, for 
example, R&D cost k is sufficiently large. Focusing on such cases, we assume that a RJV is 
unstable when R&D actions are unobserved. 
 
Assumption 2: V < Vd. 
 
4. The optimal duration for a RJV 
 Under Assumption 2 a RJV is unstable under the standard repeated-game setting. 
However, the members can still form a RJV if they pre-commit to dissolving the venture at some 
future date. To demonstrate this case, consider a one-period RJV. As it gets terminated at t = 2, 
firms get just one chance to cooperate, namely, at t = 1. If they all invest k in R&D, the payoff to 
each firm (at t = 1) equals 
  R(1) = – k + (1 – φm)δπ.  
As before, a shirking firm saves k and lowers the probability of innovation, expecting the payoff 
  Rd(1) = (1 – φm-1)δπ. 
There is no incentive to shirk if  
  R(1) – Rd(1) = – k + Δmδπ ≥ 0. 
A comparison of this with equation (3) implies that 
  R(1) – Rd(1) > V – Vd. 
 
Result 1: There are a k and a function φ(z) satisfying  
  Δmδπ ≥ k > Δmδ(π – V). 
      
       
8  
 
so that 
  R(1) – Rd(1) ≥ 0 > V – Vd. 
 
Result 1 says that each member makes an R&D effort under Assumption 2. We obtain this result 
for the following intuitive reason. Since a one-period RJV gets terminated after t = 1, at t = 2 the 
continuation payoff equals zero instead of V as in section 2. This drop in continuation payoff 
motivates firms to succeed at t = 1. 
 Next, supposing that R(1) – Rd(1) > 0, consider a two-period RJV. With two periods to 
cooperate, a failure at t = 1 gives firms one more chance to succeed at t = 2, with the expected 
payoff δR(1). Therefore, investment in R&D at t = 1 yields the expected profit 
  R(2) = – k + (1 – φm )δπ + φmδR(1). 
 A generalization to an n-period RJV is straightforward. The expected profit is given by 
this analogous equation: 
  R(n) = – k + (1 – φm )δπ + φmδR(n – 1). 
This is a first-order difference equation with the solution given by 
(4)  R(n) = [1 – (δφm)
n]V. 
Since δφm < 1, R(n) is monotone increasing, approaching V as n goes to infinity. Intuitively, 
terminating a RJV at infinity amounts to never terminating it, hence yielding the payoff V. 
 We next examine a member’s incentive to shirk (at t = 1). As before, shirking saves cost 
k but reduces the probability of success, yielding the expected profit 
(5)  Rd(n) = (1 – φm-1)δπ + φm-1δR(n – 1). 
There is no incentive to shirk if the following difference in payoff is non-negative 
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(6)  R(n) – Rd(n) = – k + Δm-1δ(π – R(n – 1)). 
The right-hand side of (6) is monotone decreasing in n since, as already established, R(n) is 
monotone increasing. Thus, the incentive to shirk increases with duration n. Further, by 
substituting the definition of Vd from equation (2), equation (5) can be rewritten as 
  Rd(n) = Vd – φmδ(V – R(n – 1)). 
As n goes to infinity, R(n) approaches V, and hence Rd(n) approaches Vd. These two limit 
results imply that, as n goes to infinity, R(n) – Rd(n) goes to V – Vd, which is negative under 
Assumption 2. Therefore, there is a limit to the number of periods in which firms cooperate as a 
RJV. Monotonicity implies that this limit is unique. 
 
Result 2: If R(1) – Rd(1) ≥ 0, there exists a unique integer n* ≥ 1 such that 
(7)  R(n*) – Rd(n*) ≥ 0 > R(n* + 1) – Rd(n* + 1).    
 
 Result 2 says that a RJV can be sustained for the maximal duration of n*. Further, since 
R(n) is strictly increasing, R(n*) represents the maximal expected payoff per firm. We state this 
result formally, 
 
Proposition 1: The n*, defined in result 2, represents the optimal duration of a RJV. 
  
We have shown here that, even if cooperation in R&D is inherently unstable, firms can still form 
a RJV by pre-committing to the termination date. 
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 We next address the question of what determines the optimal duration. According to the 
model, the key determinants are the profit per firm (π) and the R&D cost per firm (k). Examining 
the role of π in (6), we observe that, as π increases, the difference, π – R(n - 1), increases since 
R(n - 1) contains π only with positive probability. Therefore, R(n) – Rd(n) increases, and n* can 
be increased by Result 2. This gives us the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. The higher the value of innovation per firm, the longer the optimal duration of a 
RJV. 
 
 Next, an increase in k increases the payoff from shirking, making shirking more 
attractive. Such a rise in opportunism can be curbed by a shortening of the duration of a RJV. 
This gives the next proposition (proof in Appendix 1). 
 
Proposition 3. The higher the R&D cost per firm, the shorter the optimal duration of a RJV. 
     
 The duration of a RJV also depends on the size m of its membership. We show in 
Appendix 2 that an increase in m shortens the optimal duration. Two intuitive reasons underlie 
this result. First, with an increase in m each firm has a lesser impact on the venture’s joint 
probability of success and hence less of the incentive to cooperate. This diminished incentive for 
cooperation can be redressed by a shortening of duration. Second, for any given total value of 
innovation, an increase in m decreases the value of innovation per member. Applying 
proposition 2, this result calls for decreasing the duration.  
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 The above result is obtained without consideration of possible synergy that may arise 
from cooperation among RJV members. As noted in the introduction, however, recent empirical 
studies emphasize the generation of synergy and spillovers as the main rationale for forming 
RJVs. There is no reason to believe that Eureka RJVs are exceptions to those findings. In fact, as 
shown in Appendix 2, introduction of synergy and spillovers into our model can reverse the 
above conclusion. Therefore, determining the effect of membership size on the duration of a RJV 
is an empirical matter. If m has a positive impact on duration in our empirical study, we conclude 
that synergies play an important role in the formation of Eureka RJVs.  
 
5. A description of the data from the Eureka program 
 In this section we begin our empirical examination of the factors influencing the optimal 
duration of a RJV. As stated already, our empirical analysis utilizes the data from the European 
Eureka program. Since its inception in 1985 and until 2004, the Eureka program spawned 1,716 
RJVs, involving 8,520 participants from 38 countries.4 Among those participants, 4,698 were 
European firms, and 1,937 were European universities, research centers and national institutes; 
the remainder came from outside EU-15 member countries.5 
 More detailed information on individual Eureka RJVs is publicly available on the 
program’s website.6 The Eureka data set includes the initiation years, durations, and costs of all 
Eureka projects. The main industry designations of the RJVs are also available; the majority of 
                                                
4 Our data exclude RJVs initiated after 2004 as well as the ones that were launched between 1985 and 2004 but have 
not been completed to date. 
5 Table A1 in the appendix describes the RJV characteristics in details. 
6 www.eurekanetwork.org. 
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the Eureka RJVs are in manufacture, with some in agribusiness and services sectors.7 When it 
comes to Eureka’s participants, however, the information is scanty; only their names, addresses 
and nationalities are available. Thus, the Eureka data set provides us with only the RJV-level 
data but not the firm-level data. 
 For our empirical analysis we select 1,641 commercial RJVs, i.e., RJVs organized to 
discover product and/or process innovations. In the academic literature it is customary to classify 
innovations into two types: product innovation which creates a new product or one of better 
quality and process innovation which introduces a new cost-reducing technology. In reality, 
however, many innovations have attributes of both. Recognizing this fact, the Eureka data 
classify the innovations into three types, namely, product innovation, process innovation and 
product-and-process innovation.   
  Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the commercial RJVs in our data set. The 
average RJV consists of 5.1 partners, of which 3.4 are firms, and costs 34,000 euros a month per 
partner to run.8 The average duration is 41.5 months.9 This average is based on the duration data 
taken from the applications submitted to the Eureka program, so it is the average over the ex ante 
durations. As for the type of innovations, 23 percent of Eureka RJVs in our data set pursue 
product-and-process innovations while 59 percent aim at product innovations; the remaining 18 
percent target process innovations. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
                                                
7 Defined by two-digit NACE categories. NACE is the European economic activities classification system, similar 
to the American SIC system. The NACE classification is available from the EUROSTAT website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon. 
8 Our data includes some exceptional cases. The most costly Eureka RJV spent 4 billion euros in R&D, involved 19 
partners and lasted 96 months. The largest Eureka RJV had 196 partners, spent 796 000 € and had a duration also of 
96 months. The results in section 7 are not affected by these extreme cases. 
9 Time is expressed in months. 
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6. Methodology 
 Although the average duration of a Eureka RJV is 41.5 months, there are significant 
variations in duration across Eureka projects. We investigate what factors could generate such 
variations. Initial tests reveal that the residuals of the OLS regressions on the Eureka data are not 
distributed normally.10 Consequently, we construct an empirical model based on survival or 
duration analysis in the same way as in Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2008). In our survival 
analysis, the ‘death’ of a RJV is considered an event.  
 More specifically, we use proportional hazard models in our analysis. The central 
assumption of these models is that the hazard hj(t), or conditional probability of death of an 
individual RJV j, is split into two parts as in  
  hj(t)= h0(t) exp(xj βx). 
The first term, h0(t), is the baseline hazard, i.e., the common hazard assumed to be faced by all 
Eureka RJVs. The exponential part captures the idiosyncratic characteristics of individual RJVs 
j, where xj represents the row vector of all the explanatory variables for RJV j and βx the column 
vector of the coefficients of the explanatory variables. The proportional hazard function assumes 
that at each date t RJV j’s hazard is a constant proportion of the baseline hazard h0(t); that is, 
each individual RJV’s hazard is “parallel” to the baseline hazard.  
 The most general proportional hazard model is the Cox model, which does not impose a 
specific functional form on h0(t). If a prior reason exists to believe that h0(t) follows a particular 
form, the Cox model can be further specified. For example, the belief that the baseline hazard 
follows a Weibull distribution leads to the Weibull proportional hazard model, which allows h0(t) 
                                                
10 The Jacque-Bera normality test performed on the error terms in OLS residuals is rejected for our Eureka data. It is 
found that the error terms of the regression on the log of RJV durations follows the type 1 extreme value (EV1) 
distribution. 
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to be increasing, decreasing or constant over time. More specifically, in the Weibull model h0(t) 
takes the form ptp-1exp (β0), where p is the ancillary parameter determining the shape of the 
hazard function.11 When p is above (below) one, the hazard rate is increasing (decreasing). For p 
equal to one, the hazard rate remains constant and the Weibull model becomes an exponential 
proportional hazard model. In our case, there is evidence to suggest that the baseline hazard for 
RJVs is increasing over time (see Kogut, 1989). Therefore, we choose the Weibull model as our 
basic empirical model.  
 We next discuss our choice of explanatory variables. Our theoretical model suggests 
innovation value, flow R&D costs and membership size as key explanatory variables. As already 
mentioned in the introduction, however, the values of innovations are not available for Eureka 
projects, so they must be proxied. As our proxy, we choose the product-and-process innovation 
dummy variable, which takes the value one if a RJV targets a product-and-process innovation 
and the value zero otherwise.12 The selection of this proxy variable is, as we briefly mentioned in 
the introduction, motivated by recent evidence from the international trade literature 
investigating firm heterogeneity within industry categories. This literature shows that firms that 
export their products tend to have higher productivity, employ more workers, and pay higher 
wages than ones that do not export.13 More recent studies attribute this firm heterogeneity to the 
types of R&D undertaken by the firms.14 In particular, Van Beveren and Vandenbussche (2010) 
find that firms targeting product-and-process innovations are more likely to export than ones 
                                                
11 This specificity in functional form makes the Weibull model more restrictive but more efficient relative to the Cox 
model. 
12 This variable is constructed from the description of the RJVs available on the Eureka website: 
www.eurekanetwork.org, not from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) data. 
13 See for instance Aw and Hwang (1995), Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Bernard and Jensen (1999), Melitz 
(2003), Yeaple (2005) and Bustos (2011). 
14 See for instance Ebling and Janz (1999), Becker and Egger (2009), Damijan et al (2010) and Cassiman et al 
(2010). 
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targeting only product or process innovations.15 These findings suggest that Eureka RJVs with 
product-and-process innovations expect higher returns from their R&D than ones with the other 
types of innovations. Thus, proposition 2 suggests this dummy variable to have a positive impact 
on the duration of a RJV. 
 The second explanatory variable to consider is the monthly R&D cost per member 
variable, constructed by dividing the total cost by the number of the members of a RJV and by its 
ex ante duration (in months). If this variable captures the flow R&D input stipulated in the RJV 
agreement, Proposition 3 implies that it has a negative impact on the duration of a RJV.  
 The third explanatory variable is the RJV membership. As discussed in section 4, the 
theoretical model cannot pin down the effect of this variable. As we explicated in the previous 
section, if strong synergies are present within Eureka RJVs, we expect this variable to have a 
positive effect on the duration of a RJV. 
 The Eureka data contains other interesting information, from which we construct three 
types of control variables. The multi-sector RJV dummy variable takes the value one if RJV has 
members drawn from more than one industry and the value zero otherwise.16	  The	  main industry 
dummy variables capture the characteristics of the main industry of the Eureka RJV, while the 
RJV initiation year dummy variable reflects the economic environment prevailing in the year 
when the RJV was launched.   
 
7. Empirical results 
                                                
15 Van Beveren and Vandenbussche (2010) focus on new exporters to control for the endogeneity associated with the 
relationship between innovation and exports. In a study on innovation in the U.K., Simonetti, Archibugi and 
Evangelista (1995) suggest that the number of product-and-process innovations in the U.K. is underestimated. Van 
Beveren and Vandenbussche (2010) address this issue by making the distinction between single product or single 
process innovations on the one hand and product-and-process innovations on the other.  
16 The definition of the multi-sector variable is taken from Bernard et al. (2010). 
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 Columns 1 through 5 of Table 2 display our regression results from five empirical 
models. Consistent with the standard procedure in duration analysis, the estimates are expressed 
in terms of the hazard ratios, instead of the coefficients, of the explanatory variables.17 The null 
hypothesis is that the hazard ratio of the explanatory variable equals one, i. e., the explanatory 
variable has no effect on duration of a RJV. If the hazard ratio is less than (greater than) one, the 
explanatory variable increases (decreases) the duration of a RJV. Our preferred model is in 
column 5, which contains all the explanatory variables discussed in section 6. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 Each row in Table 2 displays the hazard ratio of the named explanatory variable. In all 
the columns, the hazard ratio of the product-and-process innovation variable is clearly 
significant and less than one as predicted by Proposition 2. In particular, the result in column 5 
indicates that a RJV targeting a product-and-process innovation has a duration 13.8% longer than 
a RJV aiming for a purely product or process innovation. 
 Columns 2 through 5 show the hazard ratios of the logarithm of the monthly RJV cost per 
partner variable. They are significant and clearly exceed unity as expected from Proposition 3. In 
particular, the value in column 5 implies that a one-percent increase in the monthly RJV cost per 
partner variable decreases the RJV duration by 0.125%.18 
 The RJV membership size variable has a hazard ratio of less than one in all columns 2 
through 5. According to our theory, this suggests the presence of strong synergy and spillovers 
                                                
17 The hazard ratio of the logarithm of a continuous variable represents the effect of a one-percent change in value of 
the continuous variable. As for a discrete variable, say, x2, as it is incremented by 1, its hazard ratio is given by the 
rate h0(t) exp(β1 x1 + β2 (x2 +1)) over the ‘initial’ hazard rate h0(t) exp(β1 x1 + β2 x2 ), and hence equals exp(β2). 
18 The RJV cost variable is in million euros.  
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within the Eureka RJVs. This finding is consistent with recent empirical work. For example, 
Hernan, Marin and Siotis (2003) find that Eureka firms have greater incentives to form RJVs in 
industries in which knowledge spillovers proceed more quickly. Likewise, Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002) find similar results for Belgian firms. 
 
8. Robustness 
 In this section we apply alternative model specifications to check the robustness of our 
results in Table 2. A first check concerns the assumption that the baseline hazard follows the 
Weibull distribution. To address this issue, we employ the Cox proportional hazard model. If the 
Weibull model is a good representation of Eureka RJVs, then the Cox model should yield results 
similar to those in Table 2, since it imposes no specific functional form on the baseline hazard. 
The results with the Cox model are displayed in column 6 of Table 3.19  A remarkable similarity 
of the results in column 6 and column 5 of Table 2 (which is reproduced in Table 3) confirms the 
appropriateness of the Weibull model as our main empirical model. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 We next consider the possibility that our data does not capture every characteristic of 
Eureka RJVs, i.e., the possibility that any two RJVs appearing completely identical have 
different durations due to some unobserved heterogeneity. To check this, we first compute the 
conditional probabilities of RJV deaths from our sample population. The results are displayed in 
                                                
19 If the Cox model fits the data, the Cox-Snell residuals form a 45-degree line. The goodness of fit of our Cox 
model is demonstrated in figure A2 of the appendix, where it is seen that the empirical Nelson-Cumulative hazard 
function (a proxy for the Cox-Snell residuals) closely follows the 45-degree line. For more details, see Cleves et al. 
(2010). 
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Figure 1.20 If these conditional probabilities are regarded as a non-parametric approximation of 
the baseline hazard of the population, then Figure 1 displays non-monotonic hazard rates, 
implying that shorter-duration RJVs and long-duration RJVs may have different baseline hazards 
(Cleves et al., 2010). 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 To examine this possibility, we employ the frailty Weibull model.21 This version 
modifies the basic Weibull model by assuming that the baseline hazard takes the form Zh0(t), 
where Z is the multiplicative random variable capturing unobserved individual characteristics. 
The procedure yields the results in column 7 of Table 3, which show remarkable similarity to the 
values reported in column 5. 
 Our next robustness check concerns the possibility that the results based on the basic 
Weibull model in Table 2 may be driven by time. To address this issue, we run regression using 
the exponential hazard model, in which the baseline hazard remains constant over time by 
assumption. Our estimation results are presented in column 8 of table 3 and are qualitatively the 
same as those in column 5. 
 Summarizing this section, we observe that the alternative model specifications yield 
regression values quite similar to those of the basic Weibull model, thus supporting our results in 
the preceding section. 
 
9. Concluding remarks   
                                                
20 Note that each period represents a two-year interval. 
21 The frailty model in duration analysis is comparable to the panel data model with random effects. 
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 The members’ contributions to a RJV consist mostly human resources and proprietary 
technical know-how, and these qualities and quantities are not easily verifiable by other 
members. This means that a RJV often encounters a serious incentive problem. In this paper we 
first develop a model in which a RJV overcomes this problem by pre-committing to the date of 
dissolution. We characterize the optimal termination date or duration of a RJV. We then show 
that the optimal duration increases with the value of innovation per member and decreases with 
the flow R&D cost stipulated in the agreement. These results provide us with empirically testable 
hypotheses. 
 In the second half of the paper we examine the factors determining the duration of RJVs 
in the European Eureka program. First, drawing on recent empirical literature in international 
trade, we choose the product-and-process innovation dummy variable as a proxy for per-firm 
innovation values. We find that this variable has the hazard ratios significant and less than unity, 
as is consistent with Proposition 2 of our theoretical model. Second, the monthly R&D cost per 
partner dummy has the hazard ratios exceeding unity, implying that a higher flow cost leads to a 
shorter duration, as predicted by Proposition 3. In addition, the membership size variable has the 
hazard ratios less than one, which according to our theory implies the presence of strong synergy 
within a Eureka RJV. This result is also consistent with other recent empirical work. 
 A couple of extensions suggest themselves for future work. Firstly, our theoretical model 
assumes symmetry among member firms, but in reality RJVs often include quite diverse 
members. It is worth exploring the effect of such heterogeneity as regards the venture’s optimal 
duration. Member heterogeneity also gives rise to a new set of incentive and policy questions. 
For example, which member is most likely to defect and hence is the most critical in the stability 
of a RJV? Secondly, this paper takes the formation of a RJV as given. It is worthwhile to 
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consider how a RJV is formed, given a large number of potential members. In the same vein, it is 
also a worthwhile exercise to extend the analysis to the case in which a RJV competes with 
outside firms or a rival RJV.  
 Our empirical analysis can be extended in several directions. Firstly, broader firm-level 
databases should be built for testing whether additional firm characteristics affect the stability of 
RJVs. Secondly, our analysis can also be extended to other R&D programs. For example, while 
the Eureka program is designed to promote commercial innovations, the EU has a sister program 
called the European Framework program, designed to subsidize firms and research institutes 
engaged in basic research. An extension of this research to the latter program may well uncover 
interesting differences in the ways basic and commercial innovations affect the behavior of 
RJVs. Thirdly, the U.S. Department of Commerce, under the ATP (Advanced Technology 
Program), used to collect detailed information, including durations, from perspective RJVs 
which seek exemption from antitrust investigations. Although this program is now defunct, our 
analysis should be able to throw light on the determination of the RJV durations under this 
program. 
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Tables and Figures 
  
Table 1: Characteristics of all the commercial Eureka RJVs 
          
   Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
          
 RJV duration (Months) 1641  41.54  20 6 166  
 Product-and-process innovation 1641  0.23  0.4     
 Product innovation 1641  0.59  0.5     
 Multi-sector RJV 1641  0.68  0.5     
 Number of partners 1641  5.1  8 2 196  
 Number of partner firms 1641  3.4  4 1 96  
 Monthly cost per partner (€ Million) 1641  0.035  0.1 0.001 2.7  
                
 
Note. Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the 1,641 commercial Eureka RJVs (1985-2004). 
See the description of the variables in Appendix. 
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Table 2: The durations of Eureka RJVs 
 
  Weibull model 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Product-and-process innovation 0.565*** 0.848** 0.893* 0.817* 0.862** 
	   (0.100) (0.063) (0.059) (0.070) (0.059) 
Number of firms 	   0.925*** 0.935*** 0.935*** 0.930*** 
	   	   (0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.016) 
Monthly cost per partner (in 
natural log) 	   1.095*** 1.134*** 1.209*** 1.125*** 
	   	   (0.030) (0.030) (0.050) (0.029) 
Multi-sector RJV 	   0.983 0.971 0.909 0.896* 
	   	   (0.066) (0.057) (0.074) (0.055) 
 	       
	   	       
Initiation year  dummies	   NO NO YES NO YES 
Main sector dummies	   NO NO NO YES YES 
Shape parameter p 2.191*** 2.293*** 2.809*** 3.831*** 2.911*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.061) (0.156) (0.057) 
	             
Observations	   1641 1641 1641 1641 1641 
 
Note. Table 2 summarizes the regressions results of the Weibull proportional hazard models 
where the product-and-process innovation is used as the proxy variable for the innovation value. 
Robust standard errors are in brackets.  *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 
5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level. The ancillary parameter p of the Weibull model is 
reported with the robust standard errors. 
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Table 3: Robustness 
 
  Robustness checks 
  5 6 7 8 
Product-and-process innovation 0.862** 0.880** 0.817** 0.941*** 
	   (0.059) (0.051) (0.069) (0.210) 
Number of firms 0.930*** 0.945*** 0.935*** 0.982*** 
	   (0.016) (0.014) (0.020) (0.005) 
Monthly cost per partner (in 
natural log) 1.125*** 1.103*** 1.209*** 1.050*** 
	   (0.029) (0.025) (0.050) (0.010) 
Multi-sector RJV 0.896* 0.920 0.909 0.974 
	   (0.055) (0.051) (0.074) (0.021) 
     
	       
Initiation year  dummies YES YES YES YES 
Main sector dummies YES YES YES YES 
Shape parameter p 2.911***  3.830***  
	   (0.057)  (0.156)  
	  	       	  	     
Observations	   1641 1641 1641 1641 
 
Note. Table 3 summarizes the regressions results from the Weibull model (column 5), the Cox 
model (column 6), the frailty Weibull model (column 7), and the exponential model (column 8). 
Column 5 is reproduced from table 2. The product-and-process innovation dummy variable 
serves as a proxy for the RJV innovation value. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *** 
denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level.   
  
      
       
24  
 
 
Figure 1: Conditional mortality rates of the Eureka RJVs population over time 
 
 
Note: Time intervals are in the unit of two years. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Proof of proposition 3 
Differentiating (6) yields 
(A1)  d[R(n) – Rd(n)]/dk = – 1 - ΔmδdR(n – 1)/dk  
By (4) 
  dR(n - 1)/dk = [1 – (δφm)n-1]dV/dk = - [1 – (δφm)n-1]/(1 – δφm). 
Substituting into (A1), we obtain 
  d[R(n) – Rd(n)]/dk  
  = – 1 + Δmδ[1 – (δφm)n-1]/(1 – δφm). 
  = – (1 – δφm -  Δmδ + Δmδnφmn-1)/(1 – δφm)  
The expression in parentheses in the numerator of the last expression is written, after substituting 
Δm = φm-1–  φm and collecting terms, as  
  1 – δφm -  Δmδ + Δmδnφmn-1 
   =1– δφm-1 + φm-1δnφmn-1 - φmδnφmn-1 
  = 1– δφm-1 + δn φmn-1Δm > 0. 
Hence, d[R(n) – Rd(n)]/dk < 0. £ 
 
Appendix 2: We evaluate the effect of the size m on the duration of a RJV in the presence of 
synergy and spillovers. We assume that they affects the venture’s probability of failure, and write 
the extended probability of failure as F(z) = s(z)φ(z), where s(z) denotes the effect of synergy or 
spillovers. Treating z as continuous and s(z) and φ(z) as differentiable, and letting primes denote 
derivatives, we impose the following conditions: s(1) = 1 and s’(z) < 0 and s”(z) < 0. Synergy 
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decreases probability of failure at increasing rates. On the other hand, by assumption 1 φ’(z) < 0 
and φ”(z) > 0. Therefore, F’(z) = s’φ + sφ’ < 0 but the sign of F” is indeterminate. Now, using Fz 
for F(z) and substituting F(.) for φ(.) in (6) we obtain   
  H(m; n) ≡ R(n) – Rd(n)  
  = – k + δFm-1 – Fm)(π – R(n - 1))  
  = – k + δ(Fm-1 – Fm){π – [1 – (Fmδ)n-1]V} 
where the final expression comes from substitution for R(n - 1) from (4). Differentiating yields 
(A2)  dH(m; n)/dm = δ(Fm-1’ – Fm’)(π – R(n - 1)) + (n – 1)δnV(Fm-1 – Fm)Fmn-2Fm’ 
   + δ(Fm-1 – Fm){π – [1 – (Fmδ)n-1]dV/dm. 
With Fm’ < 0, the second term on the right is negative. The third term is also negative since a 
straightforward calculation yields 
   dV/dm = – δFm’[k + (1 – δ)π]/(1 - δFm)2 > 0. 
The sign of Fm” is indeterminate, which makes the first term on the right of (A2) indeterminate 
in sign. If it is non-positive, dH(m; n)/dm < 0, implying that a larger RJV has a shorter duration. 
In particular, this occurs in the absence of synergy or spillovers or s(m) = constant. On the other 
hand, the presence of strong synergy and spillovers (in the sense that s”(z) < 0 as assumed above) 
can make dH(m; n)/dm positive. £ 
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Table A1: Description of RJV characteristics 
 
      
 Variables Description     
 RJV duration Ex ante duration, in months, of the Eureka RJV,  
     
 Product-and-process innovation  
Dummy variable taking the value one if the expected 
outcome of R&D is product-and-process innovation.  
    
 Number of RJV firms Number of firms in the Eureka RJV  
    
 Number of RJV partners Number of firms, research centers, universities   
   and national institutions  in the Eureka RJV  
     
 RJV monthly cost per partner Total cost of the Eureka RJV divided by the number   
  
of partners and by the number of months of duration, 
inclusive of subsidies 
 
 
Multiple-sector RJV 
 
 
Dummy variable taking the value one if participants of 
the Eureka RJV come from separate industries as 
defined by the two-digit NACE category   
      
 
RJV initiation year dummy 
 
Dummy variable taking the value one for the year in which 
the Eureka RJV was launched  
    
  RJV main sector dummy 
Dummy variable taking the value one for the main two-
digit NACE category of the Eureka RJV    
 
 
Source: Eureka database built from the Eureka website (www.eurekanetwork.org). 
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Table A2: Correlation matrix for the all Eureka RJVs 
 
            
  RJV duration Product-and-process innov. 
Multi-sector 
RJV 
Number of partner 
firms 
Monthly cost per 
partner 
RJV duration 1     
Product-and-process innov.  0.069  1    
Multi-sector RJV  0.018  -0.020 1   
Number of partner firms  0.257  0.019  0.037  1  
Monthly cost per partner (€Mio) 0.088 0.107 0.022 0.167 1 
            
 
Note: The matrix displays correlations for the 1,641commercial Eureka RJVs (1985-2004). The 
product-and-process innovation variable indicates whether the outcome expected from the RJV 
is product combined with process innovation. The multi-sector dummy shows whether the RJV 
involves more than one two-digit NACE category. The number of RJV partners and the product 
dummy are excluded from the regressions as they are highly correlated with the other variables.  
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Figure A1: Fit goodness of the Cox model 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figure A2 displays the Cox-Snell residuals and the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard, 
confirming the goodness of fit of the Cox proportional hazard model in column 7 of table 3. 
0
2
4
6
8
0 2 4 6 8
Cox-Snell residual
Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard Cox-Snell residual
